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COMMENT I
GARNISHMENT OF WAGES IN PENNSYLVANIA:
ITS HISTORY AND RATIONALE*
Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, Pennsylvania has per-
sistently exempted a debtor's wages or salary from attachment and
execution by process against his employer as garnishee. This Com-
ment will trace the history and application of this limitation upon
the rights of creditors, compare the Pennsylvania position with that
of several other states, and attempt to reevaluate its rationale in
the context of contemporary commercial practice and policy.
By definition, garnishment is a "statutory proceeding where-
by [a] person's property, money, or credits in possession or under
control of, or owing by, another are applied to payment of [the]
former's debt to [a] third person . . . ."' The term is also said to
describe a warning to the person in whose hands the debtor's ef-
fects are attached not to pay or deliver to the debtor, but to ap-
pear and answer the claiming creditor's suit.2 As applied to wages
and salaries, the process requires an employer to withhold all or
part of an employee's compensation and pay it over directly to, or
to the account of, the employee's creditor.
General acceptability, indeed necessity, of garnishment as a
creditor's remedy is readily understandable. A highly complex, in-
dustrialized economy is dependent upon credit financing at all lev-
els. Credit financing would be most difficult to obtain if debtors
could evade their liability to pay by isolating their assets in the
hands of third persons. Credit consumers represent the largest
number of potential collection problems. It is not surprising, then,
that their most common asset, earning power, should be the object
of substantial collection effort. The same applies to judgment debt-
ors, who are often "judgment-proof" in the sense that they have
few if any tangible assets to be reached for satisfaction.
However, the Pennsylvania legislature more than a century
ago exempted from attachment unpaid wages and salaries in the
hands of employers by passage of the Act of 18453 which provides:
If the garnishee ... admit [s] that there is in his possession
or control property of the defendant liable .. . to attach-
ment, then said magistrate may enter judgment specially,
* The assistance of computer research conducted by the Health Law
Center, University of Pittsburgh, is gratefully acknowledged.
1. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 810 (4th ed. 1951).
2. Ibid.
3. Act of April 15, 1845, P.L. 459.
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to be levied out of the effects in the hands of the garnishee
. . .: Provided, however, That the wages of any laborers, or
the salary of any person in public or private employment,
shall not be liable to attachment in the hands of the em-
ployer.
4
Although the act related specifically to the jurisdiction and author-
ity of magistrates, it has been extended to all judgments, in what-
ever court entered. 5 It is clear, however, that the protection is af-
forded only so long as wages due remain in the hands of the em-
ployer; once paid to the employee, the funds may be reached. 6
Firmstone v. Mack7 attributed dual policy considerations to
the exemption provisions:
Doubtless [the legislature] meant it should operate as an
exemption law for the benefit of families of laborers and
salaried officers, and quite likely they had in view . . . the
. . . inconvenience . . . of manufacturers and other large
employers being harassed with attachment execution . . .
complicating accounts, accumulating costs, and depriving
them of the laborers on whom they depended, by diverting
wages from the current support of the laborer's family to
the paying of former debts."
Since then little has been heard of the concern for the inconvenience
to employers. The basic object of the protection is emphasized in
the court's holding that an employee cannot waive the exemption:
We have never decided that a debtor may repeal the proviso
of the Act of 1845, and public policy pleads strongly against
such a decision. If we make it, we bring on ... the tempta-
tion to weak debtors to beggar their families in behalf of
sharp and grasping creditors. The legislature having said
that justices shall not attach wages, we will say they shall
not, though a particular debtor has said they mayY
The purported waiver in Firmstone was by express language in a
note. Reinforcing the strength of the wage shield is the decision in
Morris Box Board Co. v. Rossiter ° that even when the debtor en-
ters a general appearance in a foreign attachment proceeding under
circumstances otherwise constituting waiver of a jurisdictional at-
tack, he may nonetheless invoke the wage exemption thereafter.
There are exceptions to the exemption of wages and salaries
in Pennsylvania. The Act of 1921 provides for attachment of wages
by a wife to enforce a support order.1 Subsequently, in conform-
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1930).
5. See Catlin v. Ensign, 29 Pa. 244 (1857); Hollander v. Kressman,
143 Pa. Super. 32, 17 A.2d 669 (1941).
6. Bell v. Roberts, 150 Pa. Super. 468, 28 A.2d 715 (1943).
7. 49 Pa. 387 (1865) (waiver clause in a note held to be ineffective).
8. Id. at 392-93.
9. Id. at 393-94.
10. 30 Pa. Super. 23 (1906).
11. Act of May 10, 1921, P.L. 434.
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ity with the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law,'12
the provision was substantially reenacted. In addition, the Act of
190713 permits attachment of wages to satisfy judgments for forni-
cation and bastardy in support of illegitimate children. These ex-
ceptions would seem to do no violence to the family protection ra-
tionale since assured support for the wage earner's family is its
very object. In Deutsch v. Deutsch14 garnishment by the wife was
held proper when judgment was had on a support order. The
court reasoned that the obligation of a husband to support his wife
does not depend upon contract and the relationship is not that of
debtor to creditor. Deutsch was carefully and significantly dis-
tinguished, however, in Marble v. Marble,15 which denied the rem-
edy of wage attachment to satisfy judgment on a private support
agreement, since liability arose on a contract rather than a court
order. A non-resident wife qualifies to attach wages so long as
judgment is entered pursuant to a Pennsylvania support order.16
Further exception is found in the Act of 191317 which allows
keepers of hotels, inns, boarding houses and lodging houses to gar-
nish for up to four weeks' unpaid board or lodging provided the
claim has been reduced to judgment. Such attachment is limited,
however, to future earnings. While such an exception appears to
have limited application and it is unknown how often it may have
been invoked, there is a hint of the special esteem in which land-
lords have traditionally been held, coupled with the reduced pos-
sibility of effective distraint in the hotel or boarding house situa-
tion. Finally, the Local Tax Collection Law of 1945'8 provides for
attachment of wages in satisfaction of certain per capita, poll, or
occupation tax levies. This exception may have been thought justi-
fied because the amounts were generally small, other security was
lacking, collection by other than direct means was impractical and,
perhaps, because taxes have generally not been considered debts.
It was inevitable that the concept of tax withholding by em-
ployers should be tested against the prohibition of the Act of 1845.
That federal income tax may be withheld has not been specifically
questioned. United States v. Miller19 held that the federal govern-
ment could attach wages in Pennsylvania for an ordinary debt
arising out of a Department of Agriculture loan; therefore, any
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39 (1959).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1005 (1953).
14. 347 Pa. 66, 31 A.2d 526 (1943).
15. 379 Pa. 238, 109 A.2d 145 (1954) (per curiam).
16. Commonwealth ex rel. Bolen v. Bolen, 167 Pa. Super. 168, 74 A.2d
542 (1950).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 621 (1930).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5511.20(a) (Supp. 1964).
19. 134 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1955).
The court said that notwithstanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)
on application of state law, the federal government was entitled to be
treated as the sovereign state treats itself, and could attach wages then due.
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issue with respect to federal taxes appears foreclosed. The validity
of a city wage tax was challenged in Dole v. Philadelphia,20 partly
on the ground that a withholding provision violated the exemption
statute. In ruling the ordinance valid, the court said that the obli-
gation to pay taxes does not arise on any contract, express or im-
plied, and that the Act of 1845 applies only to garnishment of
wages for debts.
21
TYPES OF COMPENSATION EXEMPTED
The Act of 1845 exempted "wages of any laborers, or the salary
of any person in public or private employment."2 2 The courts have
construed the act with considerable liberality toward employees.
The major guideline, distinguishing compensation for personal serv-
ices from proprietary profit, was drawn by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Heebner v. Chave.23 Exemption was sought for an
amount owing under a contract for the use of horses, carts and the
services of a number of hired hands. Although the debtor had him-
self labored on the project exemption was denied. The court said:
We believe that by confining the exemption from attach-
ment to the actual reward or wages earned by the hands
and labor of the individual himself, and his family, under
his direction, we best accomplish the benificent design of
the legislature without too largely entrenching on the right
of creditors.
24
This view was affirmed in Commonwealth v. Gibson 25 where pro-
tection was stripped from amounts owing to the debtor for work
performed by his team and a teamster in his employ. On the other
hand, in Smith v. Brooke26 the debtor contributed substantial per-
sonal effort to an enterprise. The court said a jury might apportion
what was due him personally, separating it from that due on ac-
count of his helpers, and accord it exempt status. The opinion in
that case highlighted the importance of disallowing exemption of
payment due for the work of others:
The statute secures . . . earnings of his own hands; but this
is its full intent and scope. If it were carried further . ..
the profits of every enterprise might be called the wages
of labor. . . and thus the collection of debts be abolished in
many instances where ample means of payment existed.27
This rule gave way when the enterprise engaged fewer people
and was of a more personal nature. Heebner was doubted and
qualified by the court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Costello.2 There
20. 337 Pa. 375, 11 A.2d 163 (1940).
21. Id. at 384, 11 A.2d at 168.
22. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
23. 5 Pa. 115 (1846).
24. Id. at 118.
25. 67 Pa. Super. 372 (1917).
26. 49 Pa. 147 (1865).
27. Ibid.
28. 33 Pa. 241 (1859).
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the amount due a coal miner was held exempt despite the fact that
it represented in part money due a helper under a unique sub-
employment arrangement with the company. And, in Diamont T
Motor Car Co. v. Patterson,29 the court allowed exemption in full
for amounts owing under an agreement whereby the debtor was to
be paid a certain rate for hauling gravel with his own truck. The
creditor's contention that the compensation for use of the truck was
serverable and constituted profit was rejected. The court reasoned
that certain tools and equipment were but "extensions of the work-
man's hands" and that their use produced wages rather than profit.
Even the "labor of the hands" approach has been substantially
modified. The court in Bell v. Roberts30 cast the cloak of immunity
over fees due a lawyer and said:
On first impression the language used, 'wages' and 'salaries,'
would seem to involve the idea of periodic payments.
Wages usually mean daily compensation, salary, payment
at longer intervals, monthly or annually, etc. But such a
narrow view should yield to the main purpose of the Act,
that is to protect compensation for labor, and intellectual
labor is quite as worthy of protection as manual labor ....
We think the work of the lawyer is within the protection of
the statute31 .
The same consideration has been accorded fees due an architect.
82
Moreover, the inclusion of "fees" within the scope of "wages" and
"salaries" had been long since settled when the fees of a county oil
cask gauger were held exempt.
83
While profits themselves are not exempt from attachment, com-
pensation in the form of bonuses measured by profits are. In
Right Lumber Co., Inc. v. Kretchmar,4 the debtor-employee was
to receive a weekly salary plus 25 per cent of the profits. The
attaching creditor claimed that the right to profit made the debtor a
partner, precluding exemption of the profit bonus. The court re-
jected this contention and distinguished "gross" profits from "net"
profits, the latter being that which owners divide or which increase
the net worth of the business and are not exempt. The debtor
averred that he was entitled to a share of the "gross" under an oral
contract.3 5 Similarly, though compensation received for the labor of
others is generally not exempt, H. F. Watson Co., Inc. v. Christ"
29. 96 Pa. Super. 305 (1929).
30. Bell v. Roberts, 150 Pa. Super. 469, 28 A.2d 715 (1942).
31. Id. at 474, 28 A.2d at 717.
32. Union Trust Co. v. Altman, 41 Pa. D.&C. 454 (C.P. 1941)..
33. Hutchinson & Co. v. Gormley, 48 Pa. 270 (1865).
34. 200 Pa. Super. 335, 189 A.2d 300 (1963).
35. The debtor had obtained judgment against the garnishee for an
amount claimed as an exempt bonus; the creditor contended that 'the
judgment could not have been for a bonus based on profits since there
had been no profits, only losses; and, that judgment on a spurious claim
should not be exempt. The court also rejected this contention.
36. 62 Pa. Super. 604 (1916).
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held that basing a construction superintendent's pay in part upon a
percentage of total job payroll did not constitute payment for the
labor of others. Rather, it was a measure of the supervisory effort
he was required to expend. Commissions of a salesman likewise
may not be attached in the hands of his employer to the extent that
he does not buy and resell as a broker or share in the compensation
for sales made by sub-salesmen or directly by the garnishee."
Money set aside in either a contributory or non-contributory
employee pension fund is secure from garnishment. Lowe v. Jones3 8
held that a pensioner's interest in a non-contributory trust fund
could not be reached on the dual grounds that attachment was pro-
hibited by spendthrift provisions of the trust indenture and that
pension payments were in fact deferred compensation for services
already rendered. In Francis v. Corleto39 a municipal employee
discharged for misconduct sought recovery of amounts paid into a
retirement fund and amounts alleged due for unused vacation time.
The municipality resisted on the strength of an ordinance provi-
sion purporting to allow setoff against such funds for losses incurred
by employee dishonesty. Denying any right to setoff, the court
granted mandamus for return of the pension contributions and
indicated assumpsit would lie for recovery of compensation due for
unused vacation time.
STATUS OF WAGE DEBT OR DEBTOR
Apart from the exceptions, the status of a particular wage
debt, wage debtor or the strength of an attaching creditor's claim is
largely immaterial. Deferred payment of otherwise qualifying com-
pensation by means of a pension plan does not impair the protection.
Likewise, amounts not paid when due and allowed to accumulate
with the employer are secure; 40 and, a bonus conditioned upon the
employee being alive at the time his employment is terminated will
be protected at least until the term is ended.
41
Compensation need not necessarily be due from or in the hands
of a current employer to command exemption under the act. Sums
payable under contract for mere availability of personal services
fall within its ambit, even though the services have never been
demanded and the "employer" has sought to terminate the con-
tract.42 So, too, wages due from guarantor stockholders of an in-
solvent corporate employer may not be garnished.43 The language
37. McCloskey v. Northdale Woolen Mills, 296 Pa. 265, 145 Atl. 846
(1929); Hamberger v. Marcus, 157 Pa. 133, 27 Atl. 681 (1893).
38. 414 Pa. 466, 200 A.2d 880 (1964).
39. 204 Pa. Super. 280, 203 A.2d 520 (1964).
40. . Danziger v. Ferber, 272 Pa. 193, 116 Atl. 516 (1922).
41. Ibid.
42. Integrity Trust Co. v. Taylor, 312 Pa. 2, 167 Atl. 363 (1933).




of the court in Eastern Lithographing Corp. v. Silk44 suggests that
whether an intended garnishee is technically an employer is im-
material. A doctor had performed services for a patient who sub-
scribed to a surgical insurance plan in which the doctor participated.
A creditor of the doctor failed in his effort to attach the fee due
from the insurer. Without deciding whether a participating doctor
is an employee of a health insurer, the court noted that mere non-
receipt of compensation by one employed satisfies the "in the hands
of the employer" requirement of the statute.
45
Despite the high priority given claims for wages, it appears
that even such a claim will not justify garnishment of wages of
another. In Frutchey v. Lutz,46 A hired B to do certain carpentry
work but did not pay him. Thereafter, A was employed by C as a
streetcar conductor. B unsuccessfully sought to attach A's earnings
in the hands of C to satisfy his own judgment for wages. The
exemption was upheld.
Scott v. Watson47 indicates that a right to compensation for
services may not be converted to another kind of recovery right
by agreement between employer and employee. There, A agreed
by parol to sell a plot of land to B who was to pay the price in labor.
When services valued at 58 dollars had been performed toward pay-
ment of the 75 dollar price, A repudiated and conveyed to a third
party. B's creditor sought to garnishee A for the 58 dollars on the
theory that the amount was owing not as wages but as damages for
breach of contract. The court disagreed holding that the sum re-
tained its character as compensation due for labor. It should be
noted, however, that the case involved an oral agreement for the
sale of land and was probably not enforceable. A written agree-
ment under similar circumstances might produce a contrary result.
Finally, even where a father had an absolute claim upon the
earnings of his unemancipated minor child, he could not garnishee
a person who employed the child as a domestic for wages due.48
44. 203 Pa. Super. 21, 198 A.2d 391 (1964).
45. On the matter of testing the exemption of wages by the "receipt"
theory advanced in this case, it is interesting to consider the status of wages
or salaries under the "transfer of credits" method of payment used by
many school districts. Under this method, the employer directs his bank
to transfer the amount of an employee's net take-home pay from its ac-
count to a free checking account established at the same bank for the
employee. That the amount is "paid" by the employer and at least con-
structively received by the employee is technically almost unarguable.
But, would an attachment of the account at the instant of the transfer and
before it could be drawn upon violate the wage protection policy? Is the
employee's consent to this system an attempted waiver? Would a waiver
under these circumstances be valid whereas waiver is generally void? The
problem has yet to be litigated.
46. 167 Pa. 337, 31 Atl. 638 (1895).
47. 36 Pa. 342 (1859).




Since the Act of 1845 imposed so strict a limitation upon avail-
ability of accrued earnings for satisfaction of debt obligations, it
was natural that creditors would attempt to circumvent its appli-
cation. Obtaining jurisdiction outside the boundaries of the Com-
monwealth appeared as the most obvious device. As long as an
employer and his wage debt to an employee remained within Penn-
sylvania, the subject matter of potential attachment remained under
the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts and subject to the act.
A foreign creditor, therefore, was powerless to reach the debt.49
When the employer left the state, maintained offices in another
state, or otherwise subjected himself to a foreign jurisdiction which
permitted garnishment of wages, however, another rule obtained.
Bolton v. Pennsylvania Co. 0 held that the Commonwealth's exemp-
tion law did not become part of an employment contract by impli-
cation. Since a debt follows the debtor wherever he may be, his
obligation to :pay wages could be attached in a jurisdiction which
allowed such process and in which he could be served. In this case,
wages due a debtor-employee of a railroad in Pennsylvania were
successfully attached at the companys' office in Ohio. The Bolton
decision followed the reasoning in Morgan v. Neville5l which al-
lowed garnishment. There the employer-garnishee, employee-debt-
or and creditor all lived in Pennsylvania. Personal service, how-
ever, was obtained on the employer-garnishee in Maryland. Since
there was no showing of collusion between the creditor and the
employer, payment by the garnishee pursuant to a Maryland exe-
cution was a good defense against the employee's later claim.
With the growth of multi-state business operations and ex-
pansion of interstate travel, the device of proceeding in a foreign
jurisdiction threatened to seriously weaken if not destroy the wage
exemption. As a consequence, the Act of 188752 was passed, making
it unlawful to institute a foreign garnishment action or to assign a
claim for that purpose, with intent to deprive a debtor of his Penn-
sylvania wage exemption. An amendment to that act 53 gave the
debtor a cause of action against the offending creditor to recover
the Wages lost, and denied the creditor his own wage exemption
from execution on a judgment thereby obtained. In addition, the
mere institution of attachment proceedings or assignment followed
by proceedings, is prima facie'evidence of an intent to defeat the
exemption. 54 The statutory prohibition was tested early in Steel v.
49. Little V. Balliette, 9 Pa. Super. 411 (1899).
* 50. 88 Pa. 261 (1879).
51. 74 Pa. 52 (1873).
52. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 164, § .1, upheld and construed in Sweeney
v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363, 22 Atl. 653 (1891).
53. As amended, Act of May 29, 1955, P.L. 1852, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2175 (Supp. 1965).
54. PA. STAT. ANN'. tit. 12,'§ 2176 (1951).
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McKerrhan.55 A attached unpaid wages of B out of state in viola-
tion of the act. B then recovered judgment against A to recover
the wages lost. A assigned to his wife a judgment note of B's; she,
in turn, sought to execute on the note by process against the value
of B's own unpaid judgment in the hands of her husband as gar-
nishee. The court held this to be a shallow device to circumvent
both the Acts of 1845 and 1887 and quashed the attachment.
That the prima facie evidence statute is a powerful weapon
for enforcement of the wage exemption is suggested indirectly by
Urey v. Horchler.58 A, the employee of multi-state corporation W,
purchased an auto from B on a bailment-lease contract. B assigned
the contract to finance company F which maintained offices in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere. Such assignment appeared to be
standard practice in the auto sales field. A defaulted on the con-
tract, whereupon F attached A's wages by service through its Ohio
office upon an Ohio sales branch of W. The principal decision af-
firmed only local venue for A's action against B and F jointly to
recover the wages lost. No decision on the merits is found reported
and the matter may have been settled. In any event, the case
points out the difficulty of overcoming the fact of assignment and
subsequent garnishment action as prima facie evidence of intent to
defeat the exemption, even when such assignment is standard trade
practice and the action contingent on later default.
Although a wage earner has no standing to enjoin his employer
from appropriating his wages in satisfaction of a foreign attachment,
he may have an action at law in Pennsylvania against the employer
to recover the wages if the appropriation was improper. He does,
however, have standing to enjoin the local creditor who assigns a
claim from proceeding further in a foreign attachment action."'
If two parties have knowingly combined for the purpose of violating
the Act of 1887, they are guilty of conspiracy in addition to being
civilly liable.58
THE PENNSYLVANIA VIEW COMPARED
No attempt is made here to provide an exhaustive all-states
survey of wage exemption from garnishment. Some examples of
the various approaches, however, will be useful to place the Penn-
sylvania view in perspective and assess its comparative value.
Some states provide for court orders garnishing wages prospec-
tively, that is, require the employer-garnishee to withhold specified
amounts from the debtor-employee's future earnings. New York,
for example, allows up to ten per cent of a public or private em-
ployee's wages to be deducted in this manner while limiting the
procedure to cases where execution on a judgment is otherwise re-
55. 172 Pa. 280, 33 Atl. 570 (1896).
56. 180 Pa. Super. 482, 119 A.2d 859 (1956).
57. Galbraith v. Rutter, 20 Pa. Super. 554 (1902).
58. Commonwealth v. Stambaugh, 22 Pa. Super. 386 (1903).
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turned not wholly satisfied.5 9 Other states will limit attachment
to wages presently due and payable and exempt certain dollar
amounts. Illinois protects the first 20 dollars of wages due the head
of a family,60 but exempts all wages earned after a service of gar-
nishment process.6 ' Colorado exempts the first 60 dollars due the
head of a family. 62 Ohio protects wages due for the 30 days prior
to service with a minimum of 150 dollars. 63 Failure to claim this
exemption, however, constitutes a valid waiver.
6 4
Where only wages due are liable to attachment, subject to a
dollar exemption, two special problems arise. In Maryland, for ex-
ample, the exemption for wages due is 100 dollars.6 5 The employee
who earns 100 dollars per week, payable weekly, will have his
earnings totally exempt; whereas, the employee working at the same
rate but payable biweekly will be regularly exposed to attachment
of half his earnings. Corresponding difficulty faces the employee
paid monthly, quarterly or annually.6 6 Moreover, there is always
the possibility that a debtor might arrange with his employer to
be paid partly or wholly in advance and thus avoid ever having any
attachable wages outstanding. Such arrangements have been both
upheld 67 and invalidated. 68
Another variation on the wage garnishment theme is the Cal-
ifornia statute which exempts one half of an employee's wages for
the 30 days prior to service, or all of such wages necessary for use
of a family supported in that state by the debtor, unless the debt
pursued is for furnishing necessaries to such family.69 "Necessary"
has been held to mean "for necessaries," 70 and "necessaries" con-
strued to be those things "commonly required for sustenance of
life regardless of status."'71 This scheme seems unduly cluttered
with conditions which probably discourage attachment proceedings;
indeed, that may be their object. Virginia has attempted to devise
a system which deals liberally with creditors while making allow-
ance for the necessities of life. The statute provides for attachment
of wages "owing or to be owed," and sets up a schedule of exemp-
tions based upon whether or not the wage earner is a householder
59. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 300.
60. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62, § 14 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
61. 228 Ill. App. 1 (1923), aff'd, 312 Ill. 359, 144 N.E. 6 (1923).
62. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-4 (1954).
63. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (F) (Baldwin 1964).
64. Pennsylvania Ry. v. Bell, 22 App. 67, 153 N.E. 293 (Ohio 1925).
65. MD. ANN. CODE art. 9, § 33 (1957).
66. For a discussion of this problem and Maryland wage garnishment
generally, See Note, 16 MD. L. REV. 227 (1956).
67. Campagna v. Automatic Elec. Co., 293 Ill. App. 437, 12 N.E. 2d
695 (1938).
68. Kruckemeyer v. Burckhauser, 4 App. 369, 25 C.D. 504 (Ohio 1915).
69. 17 CAL. CODE ANN. C.P. § 690.11 (Supp. 1965).
70. Sanker v. Humborg, 48 Cal. App. 2d 205, 119 P.2d 443 (1942).




and the frequency of his paydays. For example, a householder
paid weekly may claim as exempt the first 23 dollars of his earnings
plus 75 per cent of the balance, with a maximum exemption of 35
dollars. 72 The schedule may underestimate the current cost of
basic living, but at least it is direct and conclusive. Tennessee
potentially reduces the standard of living for a wage-earning debtor
even further, limiting the exemption to a flat 17 dollars.78
Nebraska exempts the wages of a family head, before or after
due, up to 90 per cent. 74 The state has also made it unlawful to
prosecute an attachment out of state, or assign a claim for that
purpose, against wages earned within 60 days; 75 and, makes viola-
tors liable to the injured debtor. 76 It was Nebraska's policy on
wage exemptions which provided the background for Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Hall 77 in 1913. That decision held that
an Iowa judgment against a Nebraska worker's employer as gar-
nishee for wages could be set aside by the Referee under a petition
in voluntary bankruptcy filed within four months of the judgment,
and the amount of wages due set off to the bankrupt as exempt
property under Nebraska law. Other cases78 have limited Hall;
nonetheless, the opinion is noteworthy for its recognition of the
wage exemption as requiring special attention. Moreover, the Hall
court attributed dual responsibility to referees and trustees in
bankruptcy:
. . . not only to secure equality among creditors, but for
the benefit of the debtor in discharging him from his lia-
bilities and enabling him to start afresh with the property
set apart to him as exempt. Both of these objects would
be defeated if judgment like the present were not annulled,
for the two Iowa plaintiffs would not only obtain a prefer-
ence. . . but would take property which it was the purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act to secure to the debtor. 79
This problem is not likely to arise in Pennsylvania in view of the
cited statute prohibiting foreign attachment proceedings against
locally exempt wages.
New Jersey has yet another approach. The statute"° exempts
the first 18 dollars of wages due or thereafter becoming due, and
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1964).
73. TENN CODE ANN. § 26.207 (Supp. 1965).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1558 (1965).
75. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1560 (1965).
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1563 (1965).
77. 299 U.S. 511 (1913).
78. Preferential transfers of exempt property have been held not
voidable by the trustee. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Johansen, 270 F.2d 881 (10th
Cir. 1959); Kilgo v. United Distrib., 223 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1955). The fact
that the "transfer" in the Hall case was involuntary and contrary to the
bankrupt's own state's policy probably limits the decision.
79. 299 U.S. 511 (1913).
80. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A.17-50 (1952).
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further exempts 90 per cent of the excess over 18 dollars payable
per week. When the total exceeds the sum of 2,500 dollars per
annum, however, the court may reduce the percentage exempted.
One New Jersey court has said that statutory wage exemptions are
remedial and should be construed liberally in favor of creditors.81
Security of the "wage packet" has been a concern in England
for many years. Only recently has provision been made to reach
wages in satisfaction of maintenance ordersA'2 Unlike Pennsylvania
and other United States jurisdictions, protection in England has
never been expanded beyond the ranks of the "lower classes of wage
earners" with certain favorable exceptions made for seamen, police-
men, and members of the "royal forces. 's8 It has been said that
wider use of attachment in England is probably forestalled by
poorly founded hostility on the part of both labor and manage-
ment.
84
PROTECTION OF WELFARE BENEFITS
The foregoing consideration makes it clear that there is wide
variation in the extent to which compensation for labor or other
personal service is protected in this country from the reach of
creditors. Since a man's earnings are the basic source of his econ-
omic and social wellbeing, the status of those earnings with respect
to creditors invites comparison with the treatment accorded public
and quasi-public welfare funds.
Some form of unemployment compensation is universally pro-
vided within the several jurisdictions. Although generally financed
wholly through a tax on employers, the programs must be consid-
ered as dispensing public funds. As public funds, the benefits paid
out deserve and get maximum protection consistent with their pur-
pose of providing for the daily needs of families lacking current
earnings. Pennsylvania's protective provision flatly exempts un-
employment benefit payments, while unmingled with other funds of
the recipient, from the operation of any creditors' remedy;85 and, it
is fairly typical.8 6 Similar protection is afforded veterans' bene-
fits8 7 and less publicly oriented security proceeds from certain in-
surance policies and annuities,8 pensions 9 and workman's compen-
sation awards.90
81. Harcum v. Greene, 111 N.J.L. 129, 166 Atl. 717 (1933).
82. Wood, Attachment of Wages, 26 MODERN L. REV. 51 (1963).
83. Id. at 54.
84. Id. at 57.
85.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 863 (1964).
86. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 50.1349 (C) (1963); 65 CAL. UNEMP.
INS. CODE § 988.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 443-12 (1954).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §517 (1954).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13445, 23572, 39351 (1957).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 621 (Supp. 1964).
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While these safeguards are both necessary and desireable, those
applicable to unemployment compensation and public assistance run
the risk of conflict with full economic productivity in jurisdictions
which permit liberal garnishment of wages. It is conceivable that
a wage earner with heavy obligations and little or no exemption of
wages from attachment might be encouraged to seek welfare funds
rather than gainful employment. For example, 50 dollars a week in
tax-free and process-exempt unemployment compensation could
provide a better standard of living than what remains of a 100-
dollar salary after deduction for withholding and payroll taxes and
a substantial garnishment award. The argument might be made
that what a man is able to earn in the interest of his own welfare
lessens his reliance on public programs and should be given more
than passing protection, at least until actually received.
CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania was one of the first states to impose strict and
effective limitations upon the capacity of creditors to attach a
debtor's wages in the hands of his employer. Despite criticism of
the exemption policy and efforts to liberalize it in favor of creditors,
the Commonwealth's position was sound originally and continues
to be sound. Of course, credit is essential to the vitality of our
economic system and will be available only so long as the prospects
for collection are good. The growth of the economy, however, with
its extraordinary credit demands, has been attended by a parallel
development in the field of credit management and security. Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 91 provides for retention and
perfection of security interests in nearly every kind of personal
property, tangible or intangible, involved in sales or other transac-
tions.92 The expansion of public, private, company and group
health insurance coverage offers an increasing assurance of payment
for services in the medical field. Similarly, insurance protection
against personal, family and many types of specialized liability has
become the rule rather than the exception. For the small merchant
extending credit on transactions which do not merit formal security
measures, and for the purveyor of services, credit reporting and
collection agencies employing advanced techniques abound. In
short, the need to appropriate a debtor's current earnings before he
receives and can apply them in the best interest of his family and
all his creditors has abated.
Furthermore, the effect of wage garnishment upon the em-
ployer-employee relationship cannot be wholly discounted. The
cost to other than large employers, in terms of both money and
inconvenience, can be considerable; and, although the imposition of
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1954, Supp. 1964).
The UCC has been adopted in forty-six states.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 9-109, 9-104 (1954).
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this burden has been declared constitutional,"3 it is nonetheless
selective and the employee who occasions it may receive less than
equal consideration when promotions or layoffs are in order.
In view of the protection accorded other sources of family
economic security and the importance of personal earning power as
the foundation of such security, the Pennsylvania limitation on
garnishment of wages should not only be continued but might well
be emulated by other states.
J. M. BODDINGTON
93. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285
(1924). There, the court said:
[T]he suggestion that a substantial constitutional right of the gar-
nishee is impaired because he may be put to some additional ex-
pense of bookkeeping in keeping his account with the judgment
debtor, is plainly without merit.
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